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What happened to the traditional, long-term employment practices in Japan after the 
1990s has remained unexplored. We take advantage of a micro data set from the Basic 
Survey on Wage Structure to provide new evidence regarding the years of tenure for 
Japanese male workers after a decade-long recession. While the practice of long-term 
employment is still alive among the workers who are already in the system, the 
proportion of workers who are not covered by the system has increased. These ongoing 
phenomena contribute to the bipolarization in the Japanese labor market.   
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 21. Introduction 
     Along  with  a  steep  earnings  profile, the practice of long-term employment for 
male permanent workers has been regarded by many as the Japanese labor market’s 
most distinguishable characteristic (Hashimoto and Rasian (1985, 1991), Clark and 
Ogawa (1992a), Brunello and Ariga (1997)). Despite public interest and numerous 
intensive studies until the beginning of the 1990s, however, there has been little 
research on whether the longer years of tenure survived in Japan after the “lost 
decade,” which registered a historically higher unemployment rate and substantial 
changes in Japan’s economic structure.   
     Several  studies  covering  the  first  half of the 1990s point to the prolonged job 
tenure of full-time workers (Chuma (1998), Genda and Rebick (2000), Rebick (2001)) 
and Ono (2005) confirmed the continuing trend of prolonged job tenure until 2000. 
Contrary to those studies which have focused on the mean of job tenure or the fraction 
of life-time workers, this study uncovers what happened to the whole distribution of 
years of tenure to provide new evidence regarding the years of tenure for Japanese 
male workers after 1990. We focus on descriptive analyses to provide new stylized 
facts on changes in Japan’s “traditional,” long-term employment practices after a 
decade-long recession. We believe that new evidence in this study complements 
 3previous studies on Japan’s long-term employment practices and stimulate further 
research starting from the new stylized facts emerged in this study, including an 
in-depth examination of the rationale for long-term employment practices. 
          In order to provide new evidence of changes in the years of tenure for permanent 
male workers since the 1990s, this study takes advantage of a rich micro-level data set 
from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure, which the Japanese government compiled 
annually from 1990 to 2003. This is a representative survey that provides information 
on tenures and wages, as well as detailed attributes of workers and firms in Japan, and 
it was utilized by all of the other studies on the Japanese employment practice 
mentioned in this paper. The sample size is very large, with up to 1.5 million workers 
from 60,000 to 70,000 establishments for each year from all regions of Japan.   
     First,  we  present  a  preliminary picture of Japan’s long-term employment 
practices by providing simple averages of years of tenure for permanent male 
employees annually from 1990 to 2003. Contrary to the prevailing perception, the 
average years of tenure for permanent male workers extended after 1990. At a glance, 
the traditional employment practice has survived and even developed after the 1990s. 
At the same time, we observe an increasing proportion of part-time workers. In other 
words, we observe a dual trend in the length of tenure for permanent workers: a longer 
 4average tenure for full-time workers inside the long-term employment scheme and a 
larger portion of part-time workers with shorter years of tenure outside the scheme.   
Second, we perform an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analysis to determine 
what factors are responsible for changes in full-time workers’ average years of tenure. 
The extension of years of tenure for full-time male workers might be explained by 
changes in attributes of workers or firms. Another possible reason is changes in the 
relation between the attributes of workers and job tenure. More specifically, average 
years of tenure may have changed conditioning on education, age or other 
characteristics. According to our findings, less than a quarter of the extension of tenure 
years is explained by changes in workers’ or firms’ attributes and change in relation 
between attributes and job tenure is responsible for the remaining three quarters.   
     Third,  we  perform  another  decomposition analysis on the distribution of 
full-time workers’ years of tenure to explore the main factors responsible for the 
structural changes that were left by the mean decomposition. The DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemiuex decomposition (DiNardo, Fortin and Lemiuex (1996)) enables us to observe 
another duality in the years of tenure between short-tenured and long-tenured full-time 
workers. The gap between the counterfactual distributions and actual distribution in 
2003 indicates that the length of tenure was even shorter for workers with attributes 
 5that predict shorter length of tenure. In contrast, we observe even longer years of 
tenure for workers who have attributes that predict longer length of tenure. Those 
observations confirm a duality among full-time workers with different lengths of 
tenure.  
In sum, our analyses provide new evidence on the dual propensities in the years 
of tenure since the 1990s, which occurred simultaneously. One propensity is the 
divergence between full- and part-time workers among permanent workers, and the 
other is the divergence between short- and long-tenured workers among full-time 
workers. We conclude that workers who are protected in the traditional Japanese 
long-term employment practices enjoy their longer years of tenure while the proportion 
of workers outside the scheme consisting of part time workers and full time workers 
with shorter years of tenure has increased. These contrasting two trends warn us that 
the life-time income inequality may become even larger because workers under the 
traditional practice presumably with higher earnings enjoy more stable employment 
status while those outside of the practice with lower income level suffer from more 
vulnerability. This bipolarization phenomenon should have motivated the on-going 
debates about the sustainability of the long-run employment practice. 
     This  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  The  next section describes the data set used in 
 6this study and examines changes in the years of tenure since the 1990s, using 
descriptive statistics. Section 3 performs a decomposition of the changes in the means 
of years of tenure, applying a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. Section 4 presents the 
results of the decomposition in changes of the whole distribution of job tenure by the 
Dinardo, Fortin and Lemiuex decomposition. The last section summarizes our findings 
and discusses their implications.   
 
2. Data description 
          This study uses micro-level data from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure 
compiled annually by the Japanese government between 1990 and 2003. This survey 
has several advantages for exploring the issue examined in this paper.   
First, it is a representative survey performed by the government with an 
unusually large number of observations randomly chosen from all regions in Japan. 
The annual number of observations is approximately 1.5 million workers from 60,000 
to 70,000 establishments, which is sufficiently large to provide an overview of what is 
happening in the Japanese labor market. The sample includes all establishments with 
10 or more permanent employees in both private and public sectors, and those with 5 
to 9 permanent workers, which were randomly chosen in proportion to the size of 
 7prefectures, industries and number of employees. Second, the survey contains a variety 
of variables that examine what determines the years of tenure. The unit of analysis is 
an individual worker with relevant information on the establishment. Information is 
collected in regards to each worker’s age, sex, educational attainment, 
full-time/part-time status, employment status (with or without permanent status), type 
of work or job, paid wage (regular monthly income in June and bonuses in the previous 
year) and working days/hours as well as each firm’s attributes, including the number of 
permanent workers, firm size, industry, and location. For our analysis, we restrict our 
sample to male permanent workers
1 who are likely to participate in the long-term 
employment scheme.   
To provide a preliminary picture of Japan's long-term employment practices, 
Table 1 reports the trend of the average years of tenure for permanent male workers 
aged 15-65 in the private sector. In this study, “tenure” is defined as the years an 
employee has worked for his current firm. Contrary to the prevailing perception, we 
observe that the average years of tenure for full-time male workers extended between 
1990 and 2003 by 1.4 years. While the average length of tenure was 12.6 years in 1990, 
it increased to 14.1 years in 2003. Thus one might be tempted to conclude that the 
                                                  
1 Those workers (Joyo Rodo Sha) who are not on the contracts that clearly specify a time period are 
classified as permanent workers. This classification includes part-time workers if their contract 
period is not specified. 
 8traditional employment practices have survived and even developed since the 1990s 
and that the long-term employment scheme was robust to dramatic changes in 
economic circumstances. 
However, this is not a whole picture of the Japanese labor market since the 
1990s. In contrast to the extended length of tenure for full-time workers, who are more 
likely to participate in the long-term employment scheme, the length of job tenure 
among part time workers, who are typically out of the scheme, remains around 3 years 
at the same level. In addition, we should pay attention to the increasing proportion of 
part-time workers, which was 0.7 percent in 1990. This figure tracked an upward trend 
after 1990, accelerated after 1997, and rose to 2.6 percent in 2003. The increased 
proportion of part-time workers with shorter length of tenure might have stimulated 
on-going debates on the sustainability of the long-run employment scheme.   
In addition to the arguments at the mean, we notice that the variance in the 
years of tenure also expanded. Although the phenomenon is observed among both full- 
and part-time workers, we observe a substantial increase in the variance of part-time 
workers whose average length of tenure remained at the same level. This implies that 
since the 1990s, heterogeneity in part-time workers’ length of tenure widened relative 
to that of full-time workers.   
 9In sum, we observe a divergence between the two types of workers with 
different lengths of tenure. One type is full-time workers with longer years of tenure 
inside the scheme, who enjoyed additional years of tenure after the 1990s but those 
workers became less dominant, especially since the mid-1990s. The other type is 
part-time workers with fewer years of tenure outside the scheme, who gained a larger 
share among permanent workers.   
Our next task is to examine whether the extension of long-term employment is 
universal for full-time workers or it depends on some specific attributes of workers or 
firms. In other words, we take an additional step to clarify what contributes to changes 
in the length of full-time workers’ tenure. Sections 3 and 4 address this issue with two 
different decomposition procedures.   
 
3. Changes in the mean years of tenure: The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
In this section, we employ an Oaxaca-Blinder’s mean decomposition to account 
for years of tenure (Oaxaca (1973), Blinder (1973)). The extension of years of tenure 
for full-time male workers might be explained by changes in workers’ attributes like 
aging or higher educational attainment, or changes in firms’ attributes observed in 
industry or firm size. Another possibility is the change in the relationship between 
 10workers’ attributes and job tenure. The main purpose of the analysis is to decompose 
the difference in the average years of tenure into the two components. As a well-known 
procedure, the decomposition procedure is expressed as follows (Lemieux (2002)). We 
start with the following regression model:   
it t it it e X Y + = β                                                       ( 1 )  
where i indicates the observation and t is the time period. The variable  is the years 
of tenure for individual i at time t. The vector is a set of covariates that affect the 
length of tenure including attributes of workers and firms. The parameter vector
it Y
it X
t β  is 
a set of parameters, and the error term  is assumed to have a zero conditional mean.    it e
The mean decomposition is expressed as follows:   
s s t s t t s t X X X Y Y β β β ) ( ) ( − + − = −                                     ( 2 )   
where  t Y  and  s Y are average years of tenure prevailing at times t and s, respectively, 
and  t X  and  s X   are a set of the means of each explanatory variable prevailing at 
times t and s, respectively. The parameters t β  and  s β   are a set of estimated 
coefficients obtained by the OLS regression to use the observation at times t and s, 
respectively. Thus,  t t t X Y β = and  s s s X Y β = hold.  
The dependent variable is the difference in the average years of tenure 
between the two different timings. The first term on the right-hand side captures the 
 11effect of changes in the estimated parameterβ on the left-hand side between times t 
and s. That is, it refers to the effect of changes in the effect of the explanatory variables 
on the dependent variable after removing the effect of the change in X. In our context, 
if workers in a specific age cohort are more inclined to have longer length of tenure in 
the second period than in the first period, the effect appears in this term. The second 
term is the effect of changes in the explanatory variables, excluding the effect of 
changes in the estimated coefficients between times t and s. In our context, the 
extended years of tenure for full-time male workers might be explained by changes in 
attributes of workers or firms like aging or higher educational attainment.   
Before proceeding to the estimation, we provide a brief description of the set 
of explanatory variables used in the decomposition analysis. The summary statistics of 
those variables are reported in Table 2. Since we are examining long-run changes in 
length of tenure, we choose four times to perform the mean decomposition: 1990, 1995, 
2000, and 2003. All explanatory variables are dummy variables that take one for the 
corresponding category.     
First, we observe two notable trends in worker’s attributes; age structure and 
educational attainment. Comparing those variables in 1990 and 2003, the share of 
workers younger than age 25 decreased, while the share of workers age 50 and over 
 12increased. The proportion of those aged 50 and over gained 7 percentage points during 
the period. The higher educational attainment is more remarkable. The share of 
university graduates increased from 21 percent in 1990 to 31 percent in 2003.   
Next we turn to the firms’ attributes. The share of firms in the largest category 
with 5,000 or more employees and those with 10-29 employees declined, while the 
other categories increased or maintained their proportions between 1990 and 2003. In 
regards to industry structure, the share of manufacturing declined from 46 percent in 
1990 to 40 percent in 2003. In contrast, the proportion of services industries gained a 
substantial share from 14 percent in 1990 to 23 percent in 2003. Lastly, the share of 
workers in large cities declined slightly during the period.   
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients for each explanatory variable, using 
the observations in 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2003, respectively, as well as the 
contribution of the first and second terms in equation (2) to the difference in the 
average length of tenure during 1990-1995, 1990-2000, and 1990-2003. Most of the 
coefficients hold the expected signs and are statistically significant.   
First, the coefficients on the age cohorts are positive and larger for older 
cohorts. We should pay attention to the fact that the magnitude of the coefficients on 
the age cohorts peaked at the 50-54 bracket in 1990, while the largest coefficient is on 
 13the 55-59 bracket in 2003. This observation implies that the extension of years of 
tenure reported in Table 1 is caused by the higher mandatory retirement age in 2003. 
The larger coefficients on the 55-59 bracket in the first half of the 1990s was attributed 
to the revised elderly employment promotion law (Koreisha Koyo Sokushin Hou) in 
1994 which obliged larger firms to raise the standard retirement age from 55 to 60 by 
1998. Many firms in Japan had complied with the law before it became effective 
because the Ministry of Labor strongly advised firms to follow the “model” retirement 
age set by the ministry (Clark and Ogawa (1992b)). In addition, we notice that the 
coefficients on the 60-65 brackets increased substantially during the period. This may 
be because re-employment after the mandatory retirement had become more popular 
(Clark and Ogawa (1997)). 
Second, we observe some disparities in the length of tenure among workers 
with different educational levels. Most of the coefficients are negative and significant. 
This implies that, compared to senior-high-school graduates, the length of tenure for 
junior-high-school graduates began to increase after 2000, while that for two-year 
college graduates and university graduates declined between 1990 and 2003. The 
disparity among workers with different educational levels has widened, and workers 
with lower educational attainment are more likely to enjoy more years of tenure.   
 14Third, long-term employment is more widely observed in larger firms. The 
estimated coefficients are larger for firms with more employees. Compared with 
workers in firms with 10-29 employees, those in firms with 5,000 or more employees 
enjoy an additional 8 years of tenure. The gaps among firms with different sizes 
became larger between 1990 and 2000 and then declined.   
Fourth, we observe large differences among industries. The length of tenure is 
typically shorter in the non-manufacturing sector than in manufacturing. Compared 
with manufacturing, the length of tenure is shorter for all industries except utilities and 
finance. Including those two industries, the relative length of tenure compared to 
manufacturing is even smaller for most of the industries except construction and real 
estate. Note that the average years of tenure for services industry, which increased by 
10 percent points after 1990 in its share of the total employment, became even shorter. 
Lastly, the regional discrepancy diminished. The coefficients on the large cities were 
positive and significant in 1990, but not significant after 2000.   
These observations demonstrate that long-term employment is not universal for 
full-time workers in Japan. The length of tenure is rather diverse and depends on 
attributes of workers and firms. Based on the estimated coefficients, we performed an 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, whose results are reported at the bottom of Table 3. 
 15For the 1990-1995 period, the average length of tenure extends by 0.64 years and 
changes in workers’ and firms’ attributes contribute 0.26 years (40.0 percent). Of the 
1.29 year increase for the 1990-2000 period, changes in the explanatory variables 
account for 0.27 year (21.1 percent) and of the 1.42 year increase during the 
1990-2003 period, 0.32 year (22.7 percent) is caused by changes in attributes.   
Although the contribution of changes in the explanatory variables to the 
difference in the length of tenure was relatively larger for the 1990-1995 period, the 
decomposition analyses indicate that changes in the length of tenure after the 1990s 
were rather caused by changes in the impact of the attributes on the years of tenure. In 
other words, changes in characteristics of workers or firms are not the main causes of 
the changes in the length of tenure. 
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition only deals with changes in the mean and 
ignores changes in the distribution that are not explained by the observable attributes. 
The next section performs another decomposition procedure to examine changes in the 
distribution of years of tenure. 
 
4. Changes in the distribution of years of tenure: The DiNardo-Fortin-Lemiuex 
decomposition 
 16This section addresses changes in the distribution of years of tenure by 
employing a DiNardo Fortin and Lemieux decomposition (DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux (1996), Dinardo (2002), Lemieux (2002)). Beyond the mean decomposition, 
this procedure examines an entire distribution by using a semi-parametric approach. 
The merit of this method is that it visually decomposes the change in tenure 
distribution into two parts: the change in the distribution of the attributes and the 
change in the effect of attributes on year of tenure. To examine the long-run changes in 
the length of tenure, we compare the actual distributions in 1995, 2000, and 2003, and 
the counter-factual distribution defined as what the density of tenure would have been 
in 1995, 2000, and 2003 if the attributes of workers and firms had remained at their 
1990 level.   
We will briefly describe the procedure, using as an example a comparison 
between the 1990 and 2003 distributions. The distribution of job tenure in 1990 is 
expressed as   
, ) 1990 | ( ) | ( ) (
1990 1990 ∫ = = dX t X h X Y f Y f                                 
where   is the tenure determination mechanism in 1990 that maps 
workers’ and firms’ attributes X to the distribution of tenure, which is denoted as Y. 
Similarly, the distribution of tenure in 2003 is expressed as     
) | (
1990 X Y f
 17. , ) 2003 | ( ) | ( ) (
2003 2003 ∫ = = dX t X h X Y f Y f  
What the tenure distribution would be in 2003 if the distribution of X is identical to its 
distribution in 1990s is expressed as   
. ) 1990 | ( ) | ( ) (
2003 2003
1990 ∫ = = dX t X h X Y f Y f  
It is difficult to estimate this counter-factual distribution directly because there are 
many explanatory variables included in the vector X, and the integration takes place in 
a highly dimensional space. The DiNardo Fortin and Lemieux approach employs a 
“re-weighting” method to overcome this difficulty. The counter-factual distribution can 
be rewritten as: 
, ) 2003 | ( ) | ( ) 1990 | ( ) | ( ) (
2003 2003 2003
1990 ∫ ∫ = = = = dX t X h X Y f dX t X h X Y f Y f ω  
where 
) 2003 | (
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ω . The conditional probabilities, 
 and  are propensity scores for the specific 
observations in 1990 and 2003, respectively, conditioned on X. These propensity 
scores are calculated by the logit model in this analysis. The terms  and 
are calculated based on the proportion of the observations from 1990 and 
2003 in the pooled data, respectively. Using calculated weight
) | 1990 ( X t P = ) | 2003 ( X t P =
) 1990 ( = t P
) 2003 ( = t P
ω , the counterfactual 
distribution is calculated by the kernel density estimation.   
 18Figure 1 reports the actual distributions in 1995, 2000, and 2003, and the 
counter-factual distributions, assuming that workers’ and firms’ attributes had remained 
at their 1990 level. We have two distinct observations that are common to the 
1990-1995 (Panel A), 1990-2000 (Panel B), and 1990-2003 (Panel C) comparison, and 
a larger effect is detected as the timing is more distant from 1990. 
First, workers who have attributes that predict shorter length of tenure are 
inclined to have even fewer years of tenure over time. The gap between the counter 
factual distribution and the actual distribution in 1990 is caused by the change in the 
effects of attributes on job tenure while that between the counter factual distribution 
and the actual distribution in 2003 is explained by the change in the distribution of 
attributes. Comparison of 1990 and 2003 reveals that the counterfactual distribution is 
closer to the actual distribution in 2003. This implies that the change of job tenure 
distribution between 1990 and 2003 is mainly caused by the change in the effect of 
attributes on length of tenure. Since the coefficients on younger age cohorts reported in 
Table 3 are not substantially changed between 1990 and 2003, we speculate that this 
was caused by the shorter years of tenure after the 1990s in the services industry whose 
share is large in the economy.   
 19Second, in contrast with the shorter-tenured workers, workers with attributes 
that predict longer years of tenure are more likely to enjoy a longer length of tenure 
over time. In particular, the change of tenure distribution between 1990 and 2003 is 
captured by the difference of the distribution between the actual 1990 distribution and 
the counterfactual distribution. This again implies that the change of the distribution is 
mainly caused by the change of the relationship between attributes X and length of 
tenure rather than the change of the distribution of attributes. This observation is 
consistent with the larger coefficients on older age cohorts, as shown in Table 3 and 
also in Chuma (1998), who found longer years of tenure for workers ages 50 and over 
at the beginning of the 1990s.   
Third, a close examination of Panel B reveals that there is a chunk of people 
who have around 7 to 10 years of job tenure in 2000, which shifts to the right in 2003. 
These workers began the current job in the period before the decade-long stagnation. 
This might imply that workers in the cohort are the last generation to enter the 
long-term employment scheme.   
In sum, the decomposition of the whole tenure distribution indicates that there 
is a duality in the years of tenure between short- and long-tenured full-time workers. 
The gap in the actual and counter-factual distributions in 2003 indicates that, after the 
 201990s, short-tenured workers have been inclined to have even shorter years of tenure, 
while long-tenured workers have enjoyed even longer length of tenure. In addition to 
the gap between full and part time workers discussed above, these observations 
confirm a duality among full-time workers with different lengths of tenure. 
Overall, the DiNardo Fortin and Lemieux decomposition indicates that the 
change of tenure distribution between 1990 and 2003 is largely caused by the change 
of the effect of attributes on tenure rather than the change in the distribution of 
attributes of workers and firms. This finding corresponds to the finding from the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition that the change in the average years of tenure is largely 
explained by the change in the regression coefficients rather than the change in the 
mean of attributes. 
 
5. Conclusion and future agenda 
This paper aimed to provide new evidence on the long-term employment 
practices in Japan since the 1990s. We take advantage of a micro data set from the 
Basic Survey on Wage Structure to provide an overview and decomposition analyses 
for Japanese permanent male workers after the lost decade.   
We performed two decomposition analyses on changes in the mean and the 
 21distribution and provide new evidence on the dual propensities in the years of tenure 
since the 1990s that occurred simultaneously. One is a divergence between full- and 
part-time workers among permanent workers and the other is a divergence between 
short- and long-tenured, full-time workers. We conclude that two types of 
bipolarization are occurring in the Japanese labor market. Those workers who are 
protected in the traditional employment practice enjoy even stronger attachment to the 
employers while the proportion of workers outside of the practice has increased.   
This study has presented descriptive analyses on how years of tenure have 
changed since the 1990s. Our new evidence suggests that what is happening to the 
Japanese labor market is a rather complex story of the “collapse” of the traditional 
Japanese long-term employment practice. Based on this new evidence of more 
diversification in the length of tenure for Japanese permanent workers, further research 
should reconsider the rationale for long-term employment practices. Especially, an 
examination of the relation between years of tenure and human capital accumulation or 
between length of tenure and the steep wage-age profile surely would provide deep 
insights into the Japanese labor market structure. Other studies on the mutual effects on 
years of tenure and firm productivity would generate more insights into long-term 
performance of the Japanese economy. 
 22In addition, our findings hold an important implication for income inequality, 
which is a focus of the nation-wide debate (the Economist (2006)). The bipolarization 
in the Japanese labor market warn us that the life-time earnings inequality could be 
even larger than the temporal earnings inequality that is often measured. Those who are 
in the long-term employment relationship presumably enjoy higher earnings and stable 
employment, while those outside suffer from lower earnings and unstable employment. 
Future research should examine the relationship between long term employment status 
and life-time earnings. 
Moreover, current studies including this research covers only those who work. 
Considering the recent increase of non-employed youth in Japan (Genda (2006)), the 
decline of the proportion of workers who are covered by the long-term employment 
relationship could be starker. A further study based on large scale household data that 
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 26Table 1: Average and Variance of Years of Tenure between 1990 and 2003 
 
 Average  Variance 











1990  12.56   12.63   2.98  103.10   102.99  25.83   0.7  
1991  12.68   12.76   3.10  106.48   106.35  29.75   0.8  
1992  12.88   12.97   2.88  109.43   109.26  25.74   0.9  
1993  12.78   12.89   2.67  111.50   111.32  23.88   1.1 
1994  12.95   13.07   2.55  112.60   112.38  21.11   1.2 
1995  13.14   13.27   2.79  114.43   114.20  25.13   1.2 
1996  13.22   13.35   2.90  116.33   116.10  27.41   1.2 
1997  13.41   13.56   2.63  119.05   118.73  23.97   1.4 
1998  13.31   13.49   2.62  120.42   120.08  24.77   1.6 
1999  13.55   13.73   2.71  120.44   120.02  26.10   1.7 
2000  13.71   13.92   2.78  121.34   120.84  26.54   1.9 
2001  13.89   14.12   2.84  122.42   121.75  30.67   2.0 
2002  13.63   13.90   2.82  120.82   120.12  28.89   2.5 
2003  13.76   14.05   3.00  121.40   120.59  32.78   2.6 
 
(Note) The authors’ calculation using micro level data from Basic Survey on Wage 
Structure. The sample is permanent male workers in the private sector aged 15-65. The 
unit is years for all columns, except the last, whose unit is percent.   
 27Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
   1990  1995  2000  2003 
Year of Tenure  12.63 13.27 13.92  14.05 
Age        
15～19  0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
20～24  0.09 0.10 0.08 0.06 
25～29  0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13 
30～34  0.12 0.13 0.13 0.15 
35～39  0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 
40～44  0.15 0.13 0.12 0.12 
45～49  0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 
50～54  0.11 0.12 0.14 0.14 
55～59  0.08 0.08 0.10 0.11 
60～65  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Education        
Junior High School  0.22  0.14  0.11  0.08 
Senior High School  0.53  0.52  0.52  0.52 
Two-year College  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.09 
University 0.21  0.28  0.29  0.31 
Firm Size       
5000～  0.18 0.20 0.16  0.15 
1000～4999  0.14 0.18 0.16  0.17 
500～999  0.08 0.09 0.09  0.09 
300～499  0.06 0.08 0.07  0.08 
100～299  0.15 0.16 0.16  0.16 
30～99  0.20 0.15 0.20  0.20 
10～29  0.15 0.11 0.12  0.12 
5～9  0.04 0.04 0.04  0.04 
Industry        
Mining 0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Construction 0.06  0.06  0.10  0.09 
Manufacturing 0.46  0.36  0.40  0.40 
Utilities 0.02  0.04  0.03  0.03 
 28Transportation and Communication 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.11 
Whole Sale  0.09  0.09  0.08  0.08 
Finance and Insurance  0.05  0.10  0.05  0.05 
Real Estate  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Services 0.14  0.20  0.22  0.23 
Large City  0.46 0.46 0.45 0.44 
Number of observations.  762,393 802,645 757,259 714,169 
 
(Note) The authors’ calculation using micro level data from Basic Survey on Wage 
Structure. The sample is permanent full-time male workers in the private sector aged 
15-65.  
 
 29Table3: Oaxaca/Blinder Decomposition 
 
  1990 1995 2000 2003 
Age (Reference;15～19)      
20～24  1.980 1.792 2.194 2.099 
 (0.061)  (0.069)  (0.092) (0.106) 
25～29  4.764 4.392 4.989 5.080 
 (0.060)  (0.068)  (0.090) (0.103) 
30～34  8.504 8.152 8.169 8.405 
 (0.060)  (0.068)  (0.090) (0.103) 
35～39  12.173 11.939 11.759 11.794 
 (0.059)  (0.068)  (0.090) (0.103) 
40～44  15.558 15.866 15.568 15.428 
 (0.058)  (0.068)  (0.090) (0.103) 
45～49  18.724 19.364 19.305 19.097 
 (0.059)  (0.068)  (0.090) (0.103) 
50～54  20.394 22.385 22.406 22.255 
 (0.060)  (0.069)  (0.089) (0.103) 
55～59  19.451 22.058 23.170 23.258 
 (0.062)  (0.070)  (0.091) (0.104) 
60～65  13.392 14.506 15.498 16.158 
 (0.073)  (0.079)  (0.099) (0.111) 
Education (Reference; Senior High School)    
Junior High School  -0.004  -0.094  0.782  1.169 
 (0.022)  (0.026)  (0.031) (0.036) 
Two-year College  -0.666  -0.700 -0.614 -0.717 
 (0.043)  (0.036)  (0.034) (0.035) 
University -2.083  -2.282 -2.249 -2.250 
 (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.022) (0.023) 
Firm Size (Reference; 5～9)      
5000～  8.487 8.157 8.867 8.463 
 (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.053) (0.055) 
1000～4999  6.815 6.640 7.038 6.557 
 (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.052) (0.054) 
 30500～999  5.663 5.590 5.945 5.714 
 (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.055) (0.058) 
300～499  4.704 4.967 5.435 4.935 
 (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.057) (0.059) 
100～299  3.157 3.585 4.063 3.578 
 (0.045)  (0.047)  (0.052) (0.054) 
30～99  1.177 1.389 1.607 1.458 
 (0.044)  (0.047)  (0.051) (0.053) 
10～29  -0.493 -0.128 -0.041 -0.188 
 (0.045)  (0.048)  (0.053) (0.055) 
Industry (Reference; Manufacturing)     
Mining  -1.707 -1.952 -2.432 -2.532 
 (0.066)  (0.097)  (0.093) (0.105) 
Construction  -0.636 -0.726 -0.531 -0.327 
 (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.032) (0.035) 
Utilities  1.421 0.996 0.433 0.494 
 (0.059)  (0.046)  (0.051) (0.055) 
Transportation  and  Communication -1.832 -2.628 -2.702 -3.047 
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.030) (0.032) 
Whole  Sale  0.001 -0.491 -0.487 -0.669 
 (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.035) (0.037) 
Finance  and  Insurance  0.149 0.109 0.280 0.043 
 (0.039)  (0.030)  (0.042) (0.045) 
Real Estate  -3.693  -2.945 -2.490 -2.883 
 (0.068)  (0.084)  (0.087) (0.086) 
Services -1.454  -1.631 -1.662 -1.843 
 (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.024) (0.025) 
Large City (Reference;  0.065 0.042 0.022 0.023 
All but the large cities)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) 
Constant  -2.796 -2.656 -2.821 -2.350 
 (0.068)  (0.077)  (0.098) (0.111) 
1990 1990 ˆ ˆ β β x x
t t −     0.638 1.288 1.420 
(t=1995,2000,2003)   (0.017)  (0.017) (0.017) 
1990 1990 ˆ ) ( β x x
t −         0.255 0.272 0.323 
 31(t=1995,2000,2003)   (0.012)  (0.012) (0.013) 
) ˆ ˆ (
1990 β β −
t t x     0.384 1.015 1.097 
(t=1995,2000,2003)   (0.012)  (0.013) (0.014) 
Number of Observations  762,393 802,645 757,259 714,169 
R-squared  0.49 0.54 0.52 0.49 
 
(Note) The dependent variable is year of tenure. The sample is permanent full-time 
male workers in the private sector aged 15-65 in Basic Survey on Wage Structure.  
 
 32Figure1: DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux Decomposition 
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